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WITH DISDAIN FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CRAFT: THE PROPOSED VICTIMS' RIGHTS
AMENDMENT
ROBERT P. MOSTELLER & H. JEFFERSON POWELL*
Recent years have witnessed a growing concern over the rights of
crime victims, as well as an accompanying debate over how best to
protect those rights. One proposed solution took a significant step
forward when the Senate Judiciary Committee voted to approve a
Victims' Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution. In
this Essay, Professors Mosteller and Powell argue that the
proposed Amendment, along with the "legislative history"
interpreting it, represents a failed attempt by the drafters of the
Amendment to pacify the interests of victims and various other
constituencies concerned about the impact of the Amendment on
successful prosecutions and civil rights. Accepting the worthy goal
of honoring and protecting victims of crime, they contend that the
proposed Amendment and the accompanying detailed and
inconsistent judiciary committee report resemble much more
closely a complicated and ill-thought-out statute than a statement
of constitutional principle. Professors Mosteller and Powell
contend that the Victims' Rights Amendment, in its present form,
shows disdain for the constitutional craft and, therefore, should
not be adopted.
On July 7, 1998, the Judiciary Committee of the United States
Senate approved a Victims' Rights Amendment to the United States
Constitution.' The 1998 legislative session ended without
consideration of the Amendment by the full Senate, but the Judiciary
* Professors of Law, Duke Law School. We wish to thank Neil Kinkopf for his
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Essay.
1. See S. REP. No. 105-409, at 38 (1998) [hereinafter Majority Report] (Sup. Does.
No. yl.1/5:105-409). The proposed Amendment was embodied in Senate Joint Resolution
44. See S.J. Res. 44, 105th Cong. (1998). All references to the text of the proposed
Amendment in this Essay will be to the version that is pending currently in the 106th
Congress, Senate Joint Resolution 3, which is identical except for an additional right
discussed infra note 5. Senate Joint Resolution 3 is reproduced in full in the Appendix.
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Committee did submit its Report ("Majority Report") on the
Amendment. We believe that the proposed Amendment, as
interpreted by the Majority Report, is unprincipled, poorly
developed, and shows clear disdain for the constitutional craft. The
Amendment would ill-serve our nation if enacted as part of its
fundamental charter.
Although the 105th Congress recessed without taking action on
the proposal, the effort to add the Victims' Rights Amendment to the
Constitution has continued. On the first day of the 106th Congress,
an identical version of the proposed Amendment, which follows this
Essay as an appendix, was introduced as Senate Joint Resolution 3 by
Senator Jon Kyl on behalf of co-sponsor Senator Diane Feinstein and
a group of other Senate supporters.2 In May 1999, the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism, and
Property approved the proposed Amendment. Democratic
presidential candidate Al Gore announced his support for a federal
victims' rights amendment in July. On September 30, 1999, the
Senate Judiciary Committee approved Senate Joint Resolution 3 by a
twelve-to-five vote.' This effort to amend the Constitution is clearly
serious, and, we believe, just as clearly misguided.
Let us begin by eliminating a red herring. The debate over the
proposed Amendment is not a debate over the importance of
respecting the victims of crime. Virtually everyone in America today
agrees with that goal. For obvious reasons, the Amendment's
advocates would like to portray the debate as a struggle between the
friends and the enemies of victims' rights, but it is important that we
see what is in fact at issue. As the Majority Report demonstrates, the
advocates of the Amendment are proponents of an ill-thought-out
measure that, by their own explanations, will not achieve the goals
that they purport to seek.
The real issue in this debate is the appropriate means of
2. S.J. Res. 3,106th Cong. (1999).
3. See 145 CONG. REC. D609 (daily ed. May 27, 1999) (noting the favorable vote by
the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the proposed Victims' Rights Amendment).
4. See Jill Zuckman, Gore Offers His Gun Plan, Hits at Bush, BOSTON GLOBE, July
13, 1999, at Al (noting that the Vice President offered his support for a victims' rights
amendment during a speech in front of a Boston police station in which he outlined his
position on crime issues); see also National Victims' Constitutional Amendment Network
(visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://www.NVCAN.org> (announcing Vice President Gore's
endorsement of a federal constitutional amendment supporting victims of crime).
5. See Deirdre Shesgreen et al., Ashcroft Proposal Lets Him Target Clinton,
Carnahan, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 1999, at A12. In approving the proposed
Amendment, the Judiciary Committee also added a provision that gives victims the right
to be notified of pardons and clemencies. See id.
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providing genuine help to the victims of crime. The advocates of the
Amendment would have us address this need by writing into the
Constitution a high-sounding text that is both excessively detailed and
intrinsically vague. Achieving too much detail and vagueness in the
same document may seem impossible or may suggest to some that a
happy balance has been achieved. In fact, however, the drafters have
succeeded in providing both flaws because, it appears, they seek to
satisfy conflicting objectives supported by different political
constituencies.
The Amendment's excessive detail will needlessly hamstring
those who work in the criminal justice system. It will clutter the
Constitution with details that should properly be handled by statutes
that can be modified more easily as times and circumstances change.
The Majority Report exacerbates this detail by reading more like a
commentary to administrative regulations than a rough guide to the
interpretation of a text that will last far into the future.
At the same time, the Amendment's sweeping references to the
rights that victims "shall have" will do nothing to provide victims with
those rights. Our constitutional history shows that the assertion of
rights in the Constitution changes nothing by itself: the Fourteenth
Amendment's central goal of guaranteeing the civil and legal equality
of African Americans was a largely empty promise until Congress,
the federal executive, and state governments adopted concrete
statutes and enforcement policies-almost a century after the
Amendment was adopted. The hard work of ensuring victims' rights
will not and cannot be done by adopting this Amendment.
The Majority Report itself shows that the proposed Amendment
will not achieve the purposes that provide the rationale for proposing
it. The Report identifies a twofold justification for advocating an
amendment to the United States Constitution. First, the Majority
finds that, despite existing statutory and state constitutional
provisions, "crime victims are in fact often ignored"6 and that "the
existing patchwork fails to transform paper promises to victims into
effective protections. '7  The Majority asserts that "[a] Federal
amendment can better ensure that victims' rights are respected in the
Nation's State and Federal courts."8 Second, the Majority believes
that the existing set of victims' rights provisions is undesirable
because it creates an uneven pattern of nominal entitlements that a
6. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 6.
7. Id at 8.
8. IL at 5.
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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
single, national standard would handle more effectively.9
The proposed Amendment in itself patently will not address the
first concern. The Majority provides no plausible reason to believe
that the existence of yet another "paper promise" will be any more
effective than existing guarantees. Furthermore, the Majority's
description of the intended meaning of the Amendment-to the
extent that it is an accurate forecast of how the courts would interpret
the Amendment-clearly undercuts the other asserted goal of
imposing a uniform standard. If the Majority is correct about the
Amendment's effect, it actually would foster a patchwork of
significantly different protections.
Moreover, the proposed Amendment violates basic
constitutional traditions. It would entrust the definition of the
Amendment to discretionary choices by legislatures and courts,
rather than adhering to our tradition of giving national definition to
those norms in the Constitution itself. The proposed Amendment
intentionally permits constitutional change through simple legislative
action, but it leaves the interaction between federal and state
enforcement legislation unresolved.
Finally, the Majority Report compounds the flaws of the
proposed Amendment. In an attempt to answer difficult questions
concerning the Amendment's effect, the Report promises the sort of
specificity typically associated with a statute. Responding to other
political issues, however, the Report attempts to treat constitutionally
specific language as providing flexibility. The result is to destroy any
interpretive value that the Report otherwise might possess.
I. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT WILL Do L=ITLE IF ANYTHING TO
ADVANCE THE GOAL OF GiVING SUBSTANCE TO VICTIMS' RIGHTS
No one would argue with the proposition that legal provisions
and standards instituted for the purpose of protecting victims' rights
ought to be meaningful guarantees rather than paper promises. The
Majority's own analysis of current law, however, demolishes its
assumption that adopting the proposed Amendment will advance the
goal of making protection a reality.
As the Majority notes, Congress, state legislatures, and the states
through their own constitutional processes repeatedly have adopted
victims' rights provisions, and the United States Supreme Court has
admonished that, "'in the administration of criminal justice, courts
9. See i at 8.
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may not ignore the concerns of victims.' "' State constitutional
provisions are supreme law in state courts and for state law
enforcement personnel and prosecutors, subject only to the Federal
Constitution, which places little or no limitation on the vast majority
of victims' rights that the Majority favors." Valid federal and state
statutes are equally binding on judges and officials in the federal and
state criminal justice systems respectively.
2
Thus, existing victims' rights provisions already enjoy essentially
incontrovertible legal authority. The problem with making victims'
rights provisions effective does not stem from their lack of legal force
and cannot be addressed by adding yet another paper provision to
those already in place. A federal constitutional amendment would be
no more binding; yet, if found deficient, it would have the distinct
disadvantage of being subject to change only through a nationwide
amendment process.
Nor is the problem with victims' rights legislation due to existing
provisions being too limited. As the Majority concedes, the existence
of strong victims' rights provisions often makes no practical
difference in the treatment that victims actually receive. 3 This fact is
of enormous importance, for it reveals the true problem that victims
face and that the Report acknowledges, but misinterprets: there has
been a serious failure to incorporate concern for victims "into the
daily functioning of all justice systems" so that such concern is
"practiced by all justice professionals."' 4  Adopting the proposed
10. Id. at 6 (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)); see also Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 831 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting a strong societal
consensus that the loss suffered by crime victims should be recognized and that murder
victims should not remain faceless strangers during death sentencing procedures).
Concurring in Payne, Justice O'Connor concluded that victims' rights propositions are not
inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11. For example, state victims' rights amendments often accord victims the right to
notice of certain court proceedings and the right to confer with prosecutors. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(3), (6); MICH. CONST. art I, § 24(1). The Federal
Constitution in no way interferes with such provisions.
12. For example, federal legislation allowing restitution awards for victims of certain
federal crimes, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A, 3664 (Supp. III 1997), generally is free from
constitutional constraint. See United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1146-48 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act does not violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, the
Equal Protection Clause, or the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 430 (1998).
13. See Majority Report, supra note 1, at 10 (citing a report explaining that, regardless
of the strength of the state's articulated legal protections, victims were equally unlikely to
be informed of plea negotiations).
14. Id. at 11.
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Amendment will not accomplish that aim any more than existing
provisions do. The problem is not one of rules on paper, but of
policies in practice. The proposed Amendment does nothing to affect
the latter.
Even supporters of the Amendment are unclear as to what the
measure would actually accomplish. The illogic implicit in the
Majority's advocacy of the proposed Amendment becomes apparent
at many points in the Report. A typical example is the Majority's
discussion of a victim's interest "that any trial be free from
unreasonable delay."15 The Majority notes the existence of various
legal incentives to avoid such delay: the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial, society's interest in a swift
resolution (an interest that has been recognized explicitly by the
Supreme Court16), and state constitutional and statutory provisions
requiring courts to take the interests of victims into account in
determining the date and progress of trials. The Majority also asserts
that defendants often seek delay for tactical reasons and concludes
that, "[g]iven natural human tendencies, efforts by defendants to
unreasonably delay proceedings are frequently granted, even in the
face of State constitutional amendments and statutes requiring
otherwise."' 7 Nevertheless, the Majority offers no basis for believing
that the proposed Amendment would alleviate this problem. Indeed,
in Judiciary Committee debate, Senator Kyl, one of the chief sponsors
of the Amendment, stated specifically that "[t]he victim has no right
to have the trial speeded up, but merely to have his or her views
considered."'"
The reason for these inconsistencies could be that the Majority is
serving multiple masters. The Majority may be giving political
promises of expedited resolution to victims frustrated by the slow
pace of the criminal justice system, while also assuring both
prosecutorial interests and civil libertarians that trials will not be too
speedy to deny the chance for effective prosecutions or adequate
15. S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
16. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,519 (1972). According to the Barker Court,
[t]he right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other rights
enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused. In addition' to
the general concern that all accused persons be treated according to decent and
fair procedures, there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists
separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused.
Id.
17. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 19.
18. Transcript of Proceedings of Senate Judiciary Committee, July 7, 1998, at 66
[hereinafter Transcript of July 7,1998 Proceedings] (statement of Sen. Kyl).
[Vol. 78
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defenses.'9  Thus, the proposed Amendment gives a new
constitutional guarantee to victims, but at the same time the Majority
expressly denies that the provision would require a court to adopt the
victims' preferences with regard to timing. According to the
Majority, the Amendment would only require "courts to give
'consideration' to the victims' interest along with other relevant
factors."'2
Because the Amendment would neither change "natural human
tendencies" nor address criminal defendants' tactical concerns, and
given the Majority's own insistence that the Amendment "would not
require or permit a judge to proceed to trial" at the expense of the
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel,21 it is doubtful that
the Amendment would make a tangible difference. Furthermore, if
judges are ignoring clear state constitutional and statutory commands
to pay heed to victims' interests, why should we think that they will be
more responsive to a federal mandate? Thus, either the Majority's
position is that the provision will make no practical difference and
become yet another paper promise, or its assurance that fairness will
not be sacrificed is disingenuous.
II. THE MAJORITY'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENT WOULD ENSURE THAT THE MAJORITY'S GOAL OF
IMPOSING A SINGLE NATIONAL STANDARD FOR VICTIMS' RIGHTS Is
NOT ACCOMPLISHED
The Majority claims that a federal constitutional amendment is
needed because state and federal statutory solutions cannot articulate
and enforce a uniform, national standard and that such a standard is
necessary. At the same time, the Majority repeatedly praises the
19. Senator Kyl noted that objections from the Justice Department and from
prosecutors were the reason that the right to a speedy trial set forth in earlier drafts was
softened in the current version to give only "consideration" to the victims' interests in a
speedy trial. See iL at 65 (statement of Sen. Kyl).
20. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 19, 30. The Majority explicitly noted that the
"other relevant factors" include time for both the prosecution and the defense to prepare
and the assurance of effective assistance of counsel. Id at 30-31. Among other relevant
factors that may warrant delay in trial are court congestion and scheduling interests,
availability of witnesses, and prosecutorial priorities in the sequencing of cases.
21. Id at 31.
22. The Report states that "'[a] victims' rights constitutional amendment is the only
legal measure strong enough to rectify the current inconsistencies in victims' rights laws
that vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.'" Majority Report, supra note 1, at
8 (quoting OFFICE FOR VICrIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NEW DIRECTIONS
FROM THE FIELD: VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND SERVICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 10 (1998)).
Also, it contends that "the existing patchwork fails to transform paper promises to victims
2000]
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proposed Amendment precisely because it would not create a single
national rule. The Majority laments the present "patchwork"
enforcement of victims' rights, but its proposal amounts to a
suggestion that one patchwork be replaced with another.
A. The Proposed Amendment Deliberately Leaves Crucial Issues
Unspecified for the Express Purpose of Permitting Non-
Uniformity in the Definition and Enforcement of Victims' Rights
Astonishingly, the Majority apparently finds non-uniformity
desirable in what the Report describes as the "core provision" of the
proposed Amendment-an Amendment that is supposed to impose a
uniform national standard. All other federal constitutional provisions
intended to protect individual rights mandate to whom the rights
apply.' In stark contrast, Section 1 of the proposed Amendment
provides that the Amendment would apply to "[a] victim of a crime of
violence, as these terms may be defined by law."'24 In other words, as
the Report expressly states, the universe of those protected by the
proposed Amendment will be defined not by the United States
Constitution but by Congress, the state legislatures, and, in the
absence of legislation, the courts of each separate jurisdiction.
into effective protections in the criminal justice system." Id.
23. In some instances, the provision specifies the relevant group. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (securing state privileges and immunities to "[tihe Citizens of
each State") (emphasis added); id. amends. I, II, IV (protecting "the right[s] of the
people") (emphasis added); id. amend. V (guaranteeing that "[n]o person" be denied
certain rights) (emphasis added); id. amend. VI (enumerating rights ensured to "the
accused" in "all criminal prosecutions") (emphasis added); id. amend. XIV (protecting, in
different clauses, "[ajll persons born or naturalized in the United States" and "any person")
(emphasis added); id. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI (forbidding various forms of
discrimination against "the right[s] of citizens of the United States") (emphasis added).
Other provisions impose general prohibitions on governmental conduct and by implication
ordinarily extend to all persons. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (stating that, except under
certain circumstances, "[t]he privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended"); id. amend. VII (declaring that "the right of [civil] trial by jury shall be
preserved" in certain circumstances); id. amend. XIH (providing that "[n]either slavery
nor involuntary servitude... shall exist within the United States").
The point is not to deny that there can be debate over the precise reach of an
individual-rights provision. A well-known example is the question of whether
corporations enjoy various individual rights-the Supreme Court's answer is that it
depends. Compare Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886)
(holding that a corporation is a "person" protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment), with Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537,550 (1928) (holding that a
corporation is not a "citizen" protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV). Under all existing individual rights provisions, however, the debate over the
provision's scope is a disagreement over the proper interpretation of what the provision
commands, not over what a legislature or court believes would be good social policy.
24. S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
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According to the Majority Report,
[t]he "law" which will define a "victim" (as well as "crime of
violence") will come from the courts ... until definitional
statutes are passed explicating the term .... The Committee
anticipates that Congress will quickly pass an implementing
statute defining "victim" for Federal proceedings.
Moreover, nothing removes from the States their plenary
authority to enact definitional laws for purposes of their own
criminal systeml
To be sure, the Report is peppered with reassuring comments
about the existence of "ample precedents," the "straightforward"
nature of determining who is a victim "[i]n most cases," and the scope
of those crimes that "likely" will be included within the various state
and federal definitions of "crime of violence."26 But as the Report's
careful language reflects, all of this reassurance means nothing
beyond the fact that those who will actually define the Amendment's
scope-fifty-one independent legislatures and judicial systems-will
work with the same basic issues. That situation is already true today,
and, according to the Majority, the results are unsatisfactory. Yet,
nothing in the Amendment will require more than a broad similarity
between who is protected in one jurisdiction and who is protected in
another.
The Majority Report suggests that numerous crimes could be
construed as crimes of violence, but at the same time anticipates that
in some jurisdictions the same crimes may not be defined as violent.
For example, the Report states that vehicular offenses, including
driving while intoxicated, likely would be included if the offense
resulted in personal injury.' The term may also include acts of
"intended, threatened, or implied violence."2 Burglary may or may
not be included, and the same goes for arson.29 According to the
Report, the term "victim" presumes an identifiable person, 0 but
substantial and unanswered issues, such as how distant or how direct
the victimization must be,31 will be entirely open to the decisions of
25. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 23. Apparently, Senator Hatch believes that the
Amendment would place the sole power to give meaning to the term "victim" in the hands
of Congress. See id. at 44 (additional views of Sen. Hatch); infra note 67 and
accompanying text.
26. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 23.
27. See id. at 24.
28. Id
29. See iL
30. See ic at 24-25.
31. See Transcript of July 7, 1998 Proceedings, supra note 18, at 29 (statement of Sen.
2000]
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fifty-one legislatures.
The nation's perception since Reconstruction has been that state
legislatures cannot protect individual rights adequately, and this
dissatisfaction has been the central driving force behind the creation
of federal constitutional rights.3z Repeatedly, "We the People" 33 have
determined that individual legislatures have drawn unacceptable lines
between persons and groups in the protection of personal rights. In
response, the Nation has adopted constitutional provisions that
mandate who is to be protected from a given type of interference?,
The Amendment that the Majority supports is based on a different
and troubling premise that the determination of whose interests are
deemed worthy of federal constitutional status should rest in the
"plenary authority" of each state and of Congress.
B. The Majority Construes the Proposed Amendment's Specific
Provisions to Permit Wide Variance in the Actual Enforcement of
Victims' Rights, thus Reproducing the Pattern of Inconsistent
Enforcement that the Amendment Is Supposedly Intended to
Eliminate
It would be difficult indeed to eliminate all interpretive questions
in any constitutional amendment that addresses a broad area of
Thompson). Senator Thompson concluded that the connection between parents and their
children would certainly be sufficiently close to render parents identifiable victims if any
of their children were injured. He suggested that siblings of victims might also have a
sufficient connection, as might people who lived together; however, he wondered about
the status of a sibling who had had no contact for 20 years with the crime victim. Would
such siblings be included but next door neighbors, people living together, or friends of 20
years be excluded? Speaking as to the federal system, the Senator stated: "[T]hose are
the things we are going to have to determine when we determine what a victim is." Id.
(statement of Sen. Thompson).
32. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-71 (1872) (stating that
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments rested on "the conviction" that state
legislatures were imposing "onerous ... burdens" and "curtail[ing]" the rights of African
Americans and that "more was necessary in the way of constitutional protection");
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
UNNAMED 41-85 (1997) (discussing generally the Reconstruction-era decision to place
individual rights under national protection); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boeme v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 193 (1997)
(noting that "the Fourteenth Amendment rejects the idea that the rights of citizens should
vary from state to state and group to group").
33. U.S. CONST. preamble.
34. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (declaring that a state may not deny equal
protection of the laws to "any person within its jurisdiction"); id. amend. XV
(commanding that "citizens" may not be denied the right to vote "on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude"); id. amend. XIX (stating that "citizens" may not
be denied the right to vote "on account of sex").
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individual rights and interests. By the Majority's own account,
however, many of the proposed Amendment's requirements that
seem the clearest could be satisfied in such a variety of ways as to
belie the claim that the Amendment will create a uniform federal
standard.
The Amendment's guarantee of a victim's right to be heard at
"any public proceedings" to determine the "acceptance of a
negotiated plea" is a good example 5 On its face, this guarantee
appears to mandate a single, national rule applying to all victims and
all relevant proceedings. Yet, according to the Majority Report,
"each State will determine for itself at what stage this right
attaches."36 In other words, the legislature of one state may require
that victims be able to speak against the plea agreement when the
defendant first offers to plead guilty. Another state legislature,
however, might prevent a victim from speaking until many months
later, perhaps after the trial of co-defendants and the preparation of a
sentencing report for the defendant, at which point the victim could
raise a futile protest against the plea agreement just prior to the judge
entering a sentence on the conviction.37 In the latter state, the right to
be heard at "all proceedings" to determine acceptance of a plea and
the right to be heard at sentencing become the right to participate in a
single conversation. The victim would first get to speak about the
appropriateness of the plea at the same time he or she gets to speak
about the sentence to be imposed. Additionally, another jurisdiction
might give "all proceedings" its ordinary meaning and allow for a
statement at the time the judge permits the defendant to enter the
plea. State law might even let individual prosecutors determine the
timing of the victim's "right to be heard" on a case-by-case basis,
thereby permitting prosecutors to discriminate between victims.
The Majority's discussion of the right to be heard regarding the
acceptance of a guilty plea demonstrates that its promises of national
uniformity and of flexibility in enforcement are incompatible.
Indeed, the Amendment appears to invite inconsistent enforcement
when doing so is useful in allaying fears of the law-enforcement
community that the provision would interfere with effective
prosecution, which in some cases may require delay in a public
defense of plea negotiations.38
35. SJ. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
36. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 27.
37. See id (stating that "[i]t may be that a State decides the right does not attach until
sentencing").
38. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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III. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT FLAUNTS FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS
A. By Entrusting the Actual Definition of the Scope and Content of
Victims' Rights to the Discretionary Choices of Legislatures and
Courts, the Proposed Amendment Would Contradict the
Fundamental Principle that Constitutional Norms Are Superior to
Legislative Choice
Since Reconstruction, whenever the nation has determined that
the United States Constitution should protect an individual right, the
resulting constitutional provision has employed a two-pronged
approach. First, each new Amendment itself has identified the norm
to be observed and, expressly or implicitly, the persons entitled to
invoke the norm. Thus, both norm and scope are themselves rules of
constitutional law that can be invoked in court and, where necessary,
enforced through the courts' exercise of the power of judicial
review. 9 Second, each new Amendment has provided Congress with
the power to enforce the Amendment through appropriate
legislation. Recently, in City of Boerne v. Flores,40 the Supreme Court
discussed this tradition at length and laid great weight to the
distinction between defining the meaning and scope of constitutional
rights, which is a task performed by the people themselves in each
amendment as interpreted by the courts, and creating remedial or
preventative rules, which is Congress's domain.4' City of Boerne
struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act42 on the grounds
that the Act went beyond creating enforcement mechanisms to
determining, in a manner inconsistent with judicial precedent, "what
constitutes a constitutional violation."43 Under the Justices' analysis,
the Act was an attempt by Congress to displace the Court's
interpretation of an individual rights amendment.44
39. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (stating that the
determination of "what constitutes a constitutional violation" is a judicial rather than a
legislative power); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-75 (1990)
(noting that the determination of the scope of "the people" protected by the Fourth
Amendment is a judicial function).
40. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
41. See id. at 519-20; see also id. at 516-24 (reasoning that the power to enforce
constitutional rights does not include the power to determine what constitutes a violation
of those rights).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
43. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
44. Many observers, including members of Congress, have expressed reservations
about or disagreement with City of Boeme, and the authors of this Essay are not
382 [Vol. 78
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The proposed Victims' Rights Amendment deliberately would
grant to Congress and the state legislatures the very power that City
of Boerne held that earlier constitutional amendments do not
provide-the power to determine the actual meaning of the rights
protected by the amendment. Section 3 of the proposed Amendment
states in familiar fashion that "Congress shall have the power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." 45  In explaining
Section 3, however, the Majority Report states something further and
different:
This provision will be interpreted in similar fashion [to City
of Boerne] to allow Congress to "enforce" the lights, that is,
to insure that the rights conveyed by the amendment are in
fact respected. At the same time, consistent with the plain
language of the provision, the Federal Government and the
States will retain their power to implement the
amendment.41
While the first of these sentences is consistent with City of
Boerne, the second sentence apparently means that the Amendment
would vest the national and state legislatures with precisely the power
that City of Boerne held was beyond the scope of an enforcement
clause-"the power to decree the substance of the ... Amendment's
restrictions on the States."'47 For example, with regard to the right to
a "trial free from unreasonable delay," the Majority Report states
that "[t]he Committee also anticipates that more content may be
given to this right in implementing legislation." 48 Similarly, for the
right to an order of restitution from the convicted defendant, the
Majority Report states that "[tihe relevant details will be spelled out
under the resulting case law or, more likely, statutes to implement the
amendment."49
necessarily convinced that these observers are wrong. See, e.g., Elwin Chemerinsky, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is a Constitutional Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 601, 602 (1998); McConnell, supra note 32, at 193. On the issue of how to
construe the scope of Congress's powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
however, City of Boerne was almost unanimous: only Justice Breyer even intimated that
the Court's views on Section 5 might not be correct. Compare City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at
545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the Court's interpretation of Section 5), with
id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (declining to reach the Section 5 issue). There is thus no
reason to think that the Court would be likely to reconsider that issue in the foreseeable
future.
45. S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999).
46. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 35.
47. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
48. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 31 (emphasis added).
49. Id (emphasis added).
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In this and other instances, the Majority apparently intends the
Amendment to permit legislatures, as well as courts acting as
policymakers in the absence of legislation, to determine what specific
interests will and will not be protected. Within the outer bounds of
capricious misapplication, courts would have no constitutional basis
for rejecting the choices policymakers might adopt. Unlike the
existing individual rights provisions in the Constitution, the proposed
Amendment in many instances would license legislatures to adopt
their own preferences rather than subject those preferences to a
superior constitutional rule. In such cases, the proposed Amendment
would invert the fundamental relationship between the Constitution
and legislative power by making the legislature the master, rather
than the servant, of the constitutional norm at issue.
Not only is the Majority attempting to change prior
constitutional practice, but it is attempting to do so indirectly and
covertly through the Majority Report rather than directly and openly
through the text of the Amendment. At the time hearings were
conducted on the proposed Amendment in the Senate Judiciary
Committee in April 1998, the text of Section 3 stated that" 'Congress
and the States shall have the power to implement and enforce this
article within their respective jurisdictions.' " Professor Paul
Cassell, testifying in support of the Amendment, explained in his
prepared statement that
the "enforcement" power in the Crime Victims' Rights
Amendment is somewhat broader than the power in Section
5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment], since the enforcement
power includes not only the power to "enforce" but also the
power to "implement." This language is necessitated by the
Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,
which struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993. In that decision the Court described Congressional
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment in rather
crabbed terms. To avoid the possibility that the Court could
strike down victims implementing legislation as beyond the
power of Congress or the Courts, the Crime Victims' Rights
Amendment specifically authorizes implementation.51
In response to questions posed at the hearing, Professor Cassell
explained that the intent of the language in Section 3 was to avoid the
50. A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Crime Victims: Hearing on S.J.
Res. 44 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 43 (1998) (statement of Prof, Paul
G. Cassell) (quoting the text of the Amendment) (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 44 (statement of Prof. Paul G. Cassell) (footnotes omitted).
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holding in City of Boerne. His view was that the language created a
new category: "not ... changing constitutional fights, not enforcing
rights, but implementing rights"-a "sort of intermediate category of
power."'52
Professor Cassell's explanation of the newly formulated power to
implement constitutional rights provided no clear basis to distinguish
it from the power to define, and therefore to change, constitutional
rights. In fact, no existing definition would create a workable
distinction for an "intermediate category of power." His remarks and
the Majority Report make it clear that the very point of giving
Congress and the states this so-called power of implementation is to
enable them to determine, and thus to vary, what governmental
conduct the Amendment requires and forbids. This is exactly the
same authority that City of Boerne termed "the power to decree the
substance of [an] Amendment's restrictions on the States" and "to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."' As Justice
Stevens has explained, such a "legislative attempt 'to interpret and
elaborate on the meaning' of [a constitutional provision] ... violate[s]
the principle that the 'power to interpret the Constitution in a case or
controversy remains in the Judiciary.' "
Shortly before the proposed Amendment was voted out of the
Judiciary Committee, the language in Section 3 giving the states the
power both "to implement" and to enforce the Amendment by
legislation was dropped from the Amendment, as was Congress's
power "to implement" it by legislation. Nevertheless, the Majority,
through its Report, apparently intended to preserve this
unprecedented expansion of state and federal legislative power to
define the substance of constitutional rights: "At the same time,
consistent with the plain language of the provision, the Federal
Government and the States will retain their power to implement the
amendment."55 This statement asserts a new power and is neither the
result of the plain meaning of the proposed Amendment's language
nor of the operation of established law. It is both unprecedented and
disingenuous.
52. Id. at 118 (response of Prof. Paul G. Cassell).
53. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,519 (1997).
54. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199,2217 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524).
55. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 35 (emphasis added).
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B. The Proposed Amendment Intentionally Provides for
Constitutional Change Through Simple Legislation
Unlike any existing constitutional amendment, the proposed
Victims' Rights Amendment provides a formula for exceptions by
legislation. Section 3 states that "[e]xceptions to the rights
established by this article may be created only when necessary to
achieve a compelling interest. '56 Senator Kyl described the provision
as follows: "Now, ordinarily, the only way that you can change
constitutional rights is to amend the Constitution, and that is a very
significant process, as we all know. So we have gone a huge step by
literally providing for an amendment to the Constitution here by
legislative action."'57 In combination with the Majority Report's
interpretation of the proposed Amendment as permitting states to
exercise the power to enforce and implement its provisions, this
analysis is quite extraordinary. Not only is the substantive scope of
the provision defined in the first instance by the legislative body, but
states also may create exceptions that differ according to each
jurisdiction's perception of the imperatives of criminal law
enforcement.
Section 3's provision for amendment through legislation clearly
demonstrates its proponents' lack of serious commitment to the
traditional American understanding of fundamental law. One of the
major purposes of enshrining a provision in the Constitution, as
opposed to including it in ordinary legislation, is to set it off limits
from ordinary tinkering by legislation.58  To be sure, few
constitutional rights are absolute; accordingly, the courts have
recognized in many instances that societal necessity may permit
governmental action that would otherwise infringe a protected
liberty.59 As the Court uses it, the language of "compelling interest"
56. S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999).
57. Transcript of July 7, 1998 Proceedings, supra note 18, at 89 (statement of Sen.
Kyl); see also iL at 102 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (stating that the proposed Amendment
itself could be altered by statute "if a compelling interest is established").
58. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (rejecting the
argument that "the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act"); see also City
of Boeme, 521 U.S. at 529 (stating that, if legislation could alter constitutional meaning, "it
is difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power"); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 288 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("What the Constitution has fixed may not be changed except by constitutional
amendment.").
59. See e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996) (stating
that "the First Amendment... does not guarantee absolute freedom of speech"); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,237 (1995) (noting that when "race-based action is
necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if
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indicates the point at which the judiciary recognizes a limit on the
scope of a constitutional fight. In identifying such limits, the courts
are carrying out their duty to interpret the authoritative meaning of
the Constitution. They are not exercising a discretionary power to
create exceptions to the Constitution's demands.
Section 3, in contrast, would vest Congress with legislative power
to define exceptions to the constitutional rule. The Section's first
sentence, authorizing Congress to enforce the Amendment through
appropriate legislation, is an express delegation of such power.
Under common sense and customary norms of constitutional
interpretation alike, the Section's second sentence, which allows for
exceptions in cases where the government has a compelling interest,
also addresses Congress's power. Section 3 thus borrows the
language of "compelling interest" that the Supreme Court applies in
defining the limits of constitutional rights for what appears to be the
novel and disturbing purpose of expressly permitting Congress to
create discretionary, policy-driven exceptions to judicially defined
fights. Under the Amendment, Congress presumably would
determine what interests are compelling and, thus, what exceptions to
create. While the courts undoubtedly would retain the authority to
invalidate wholly unreasonable legislative decisions, nothing in the
text of the Amendment or in the Majority Report would legitimize
any more searching judicial review.
At first glance, Section 3 might seem merely to be an example of
inartful drafting. The provision's purpose, surely, is to instruct the
judiciary to apply the usual "strict scrutiny" approach when
evaluating legislation that implicates victims' rights, but, perhaps
through some oversight, the drafters placed it in a confusing location
in the text. Although the courts might read the sentence as an
endorsement of strict scrutiny, the drafters have told us that they
meant something different. Indeed, Senator Kyl's remarks are a
more flamboyant statement of a theme that pervades the Majority
Report. As reflected in that document, the Amendment's supporters
maintain that they intend what they appear to be saying-the
Amendment is supposed to be subject to substantive change through
the legislative process. A constitutional provision that makes sense
only if one relies on the courts to ignore both its text and its
proponents' explanations is not an Amendment that the Nation
should be willing to add to its fundamental law.6"
it satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test").
60. Indeed, the exceptions provision actually does not track the Supreme Court's
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The disturbing novelty and ambiguity of the exceptions provision
is compounded by the uncertainty that the Majority Report creates
about state legislative authority. In light of the Report's statements
about the states' unwritten but plenary power to implement the
Amendment, one must assume that each state will be equally free
with Congress to exercise such power. The Majority labels this new
legislative power as a "necessary flexibility."'61 In fact, this authority is
further confirmation of the Majority's radical indifference to our
constitutional traditions.
In one of the Supreme Court's most famous decisions, the great
Chief Justice John Marshall said that "[t]he constitution is either a
superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on
a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable
when the legislature shall please to alter it."62 In Marshall's view,
"[b]etween these alternatives there is no middle ground."63  The
principle that the legislature cannot alter the meaning and application
of the Constitution is "one of the fundamental principles of our
society."'  The proponents of the Amendment are of a different
mind. In the name of "necessary flexibility," they want to deny the
status of "superior, paramount law" to the new rights that they are
"protecting."65 It is ironic that, in the name of dignifying victims'
rights, the Amendment's supporters propose to create a new and
lesser constitutional status for those rights.
C. The Majority's Interpretation of the Proposed Amendment Leaves
the Relationship Between Federal and State Enforcement
Legislation Entirely Unclear
The Majority Report asserts that Section 3 of the Amendment,
which delegates to Congress the power to enforce the Amendment by
appropriate legislation, will be interpreted "in similar fashion" to the
parallel language found in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.66
strict scrutiny test, which ordinarily requires that the legislation be narrowly tailored to
accomplish a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. This
divergence substantially weakens any argument that the provision is simply an
endorsement of the strict scrutiny test. Thus, the actual meaning of the provision, whether
it addresses Congress's power or the courts' level of scrutiny, is quite uncertain.
61. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 35.




66. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 35. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
states: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
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Other passages in the Report, however, directly contradict this
assertion. Congress's legislative authority under the enforcement
clauses of existing amendments is, within its scope, superior to any
state constitutional or statutory provisions. As long as it is enforcing
an amendment, Congress is free to displace state choices. In the
event of a conflict between a valid federal enforcement statute and a
state law, the Supremacy Clause ensures that the federal statute must
be followed.67 In contrast, as interpreted by the Majority, the
proposed Amendment apparently would not authorize Congress to
override state choices on a variety of issues that plainly would seem to
involve enforcement of the Amendment. For example, the proposed
Amendment specifies that victims shall receive "reasonable notice" of
any proceeding, and it authorizes Congress to "enforce" the
Amendment "by appropriate legislation." Senator Kyl, a chief
sponsor of the Amendment, interpreted this language to mean that
"[t]he State will determine, by enabling legislation, whether it is the
court, whether it is the prosecutor, whether its is the clerk of court,
whether it is the judge, whoever. I mean, each State could do this
differently as we implement other constitutional amendments."'
Senator Hatch, on the other hand, believed that the
Amendment's provisions would "grant[] Congress sole power to
enforce the provisions of the victims' rights amendment, and thus,
inter alia, to define terms such as 'victim' and 'violent crime' and to
enforce the guarantees of 'reasonable notice' of public proceedings."69
The Senator lamented the Amendment's enforcement-power
provision as a further move toward "federalization of crime and the
nationalization of our criminal justice system."7
It is impossible at this point to know whether Senator Kyl or
Senator Hatch is correct, although the Majority Report certainly
provides strong support for the former. But it is unconscionable to
propose an amendment to the Constitution of the United States so
unclear that even its supporters cannot agree on the relationship it
will create between the federal and state governments. Constitutional
change is too serious a matter to be treated as a roll of the dice, with
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
67. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land
68. Transcript of July 7, 1998 Proceedings, supra note 18, at 70 (statement of Sen.
Kyl).
69. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 44 (additional views of Sen. Hatch).
70. Id. (additional views of Sen. Hatch).
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the winners and losers decided by chance and the unpredictable
decisions of future legislators and judges.
IV. THE MAJORITY REPORT Is AN INCONSISTENT AND LIKELY
INEFFEcTIVE INTERPRETIVE TOOL
A. The Report Makes a False Promise of Statutory Specificity in an
Effort to Answer Difficult Questions of Application
Through analysis in the Report, the Majority attempts to fine
tune the apparent meaning of the Amendment in order to solve
specific issues that it found politically problematic. The solutions that
the Majority gives belong in statutory form rather than in a
constitutional amendment, and the efficacy of the Amendment
obviously would remain in doubt until courts have construed the
Amendment after its passage.
A specific and debatable interpretation of the general language
of the proposed Amendment is found in the Majority Report's
interpretation of the right "to be heard, if present, and to submit a
statement at all [public] proceedings to determine ... a sentence."
The Report states that these words mean that Congress and the states
remain free to set "certain limits" on what is relevant victim-impact
testimony.72 By example, it states that a jurisdiction may determine
that a victim's views on the desirability of a capital sentence are not
relevant and, therefore, may not be expressed.73 With absolutely no
support from the text of the proposed Amendment, the Majority
asserts that the Amendment grants the opportunity to speak because
making a statement sometimes can be a powerful catharsis for a
victim.74 On that basis, the Report claims that a victim has the right
to make a statement even if the sentence is mandatory.75 Thus, as to
some types of statements by victims, the Majority Report contends
that the language of the Amendment means that statements made
irrelevant by some legislative judgments-such as a victim's
opposition to the death penalty-are inadmissible. By contrast, the
Majority Report contends other legislative determinations of
irrelevancy, such as mandatory sentencing regardless of the victims'
statements, do not render the statements inadmissible, however,
71. S.J. Res. 3,106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
72. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 28.
73. See iii at 28-29.




because the purpose of the latter statements is to facilitate catharsis.
In other areas as well, the Majority Report describes differences
in the allowed treatment of statements at sentencing despite the
Amendment's failure to address such distinctions. On the one hand,
the Report states that reasonable limits may be placed on the length
and content of victim impact statements at sentencing,76 as well as on
the number of victims permitted to give oral statements when a large
number of victims are involved. 77 On the other hand and with no
apparent textual support, it states that "victims should always be
given the power to determine the form of the statement."78 Thus, the
fact that a prior statement by the victim is in the file is not a basis to
deny the making of a new statement in the form desired by the
victim. 79 The basis for the Majority's treating length, content, and
number of statements differently than the form of the statement is
inexplicable.
Additionally, the proposed Amendment creates the right for
victims "to be heard ... at all public proceedings to determine ... an
acceptance of a negotiated plea. '8  The Majority asserts that
individual jurisdictions could decide "at what stage this right
attaches," apparently responding to prosecutors' concerns that, in
multiple-defendant cases, early disclosure of the factors motivating a
plea agreement with one defendant might jeopardize the deal and
impair effective prosecution of co-defendants. 81  Thus, while the
proposed Amendment provides the right to be heard at proceedings
to determine the acceptance of a plea, the Majority Report asserts
that states may decide that the right does not attach until sentencing if
the plea "can still be rejected by the court" at that point. 2 This
interpretation may solve political problems with prosecutors and may
be a permissible interpretation of the plain language of the proposed
Amendment, but the Majority Report's confidence in asserting it
assumes a deeply problematic view of the role of legislative history in
the interpretation of a constitutional amendment.'
76. See iL at 29.
77. See id. at 36.
78. Id. at 29.
79. See id.
80. S.J. Res. 3,106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
81. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 27.
82. Id.
83. Many prominent jurists and constitutional scholars reject any claim that the
intentions of the drafters of a constitutional provision govern the interpretation of the
provision once it is adopted. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-
Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
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The Majority makes a similar attempt to provide the reassuring
specificity of legislation for the unadorned clause guaranteeing
"reasonable notice of a release or escape from custody."4 The
Majority asserts that notice is not required by this provision if a
prisoner is moved from one custodial facility to another, reclassified
in terms of his security level, or allowed to participate in a supervised
work detail outside the prison wallsY. Notice is required, however, if
the prisoner enters a noncustodial work-release program or takes a
weekend furlough. 6 While these may be reasonable policy outcomes,
they are hardly obvious as matters of constitutional interpretation,
and the weight that a future court would place on such distinctions is
quite uncertain.
These examples show how the Majority attempts to reconcile the
competing interests of victims groups with those primarily concerned
with efficient and effective criminal law enforcement by glossing the
simple words of a constitutional clause with the detailed provisions of
a lengthy piece of legislation. The effort is certainly unwieldy.
Moreover, the Report may well prove ineffective in controlling the
interpretation future courts place upon an amendment that is likely in
the end to be judged by what its text plainly says. It is difficult to see
how these problems could be lost on the drafters of the Majority
Report, suggesting that their purpose may be as much to mollify for
the moment the largely incompatible concerns of political
constituencies as it is to shape the future interpretation of the
proposed Amendment.
B. The Majority Report's Assertion that the Amendment's
Apparently Clear and Inflexible Language Is Actually "Flexible"
Renders that Language Indeterminate
Section 3 of the proposed Amendment states that "[e]xceptions
to the rights established by this article may be created only when
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997) (rejecting "the drafter's intent as the criterion for interpretation of the
Constitution"); cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra, at 66 ("[lIt is the text's meaning, and not the
content of anyone's expectations or intentions, that binds us as law.").
84. S.J. Res. 3, § 1.
85. See Majority Report, supra note 1, at 30.
86. See id
Similarly, "parole" is said to mean not only parole, but release with conditions in
states that have abolished parole. Also, it is supposed to include conditional release from
mental facilities. See id.
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necessary to achieve a compelling interest."'  The "compelling
interest" standard is well-established in constitutional law.' It is
demanding and unyielding. It is not a term that can be lightly
disregarded or easily given new meaning.
It is this quite restrictive phrase- "compelling interest"-that
provides the only basis for relief from enforcement of the
Amendment's provisions. Yet, the Majority states that it provides
"necessary flexibility for handling unusual situations."' 9 "Flexibility"
is not a word that can be applied easily or sensibly to "compelling
interest."
Indeed, the Majority misuses the term in order to reassure those
concerned about the possibility that the Amendment may result in
the denial of justice to defendants who turn out to be victims instead.
During Committee deliberations, Senator Fred Thompson raised the
question of the treatment of a "battered spouse" who shoots her
husband, perhaps in self-defense:
I would assume, if she is charged, then the husband under
those circumstances is the victim and he is entitled to all
those rights. Even before she is convicted, he is entitled to
be there and have say as to whether or not she gets out on
bond and those sorts of things.90
Senator Kyl's response was that the case presented an obvious
problem and that Congress would deal with the issue by legislating an
exception.9' The Senator did not, however, provide an explanation of
how the legislation would be justified or defined. The Majority
Report provides no better explanation for this troubling set of cases
in which guilt is often legitimately in doubt and the label of victim is
frequently highly debatable. Instead, the Report makes the following
remarkable statement about the "compelling interest" test for
domestic violence cases: "[I]n some cases of domestic violence, the
dynamics of victim-offender relationships may require some
modification of otherwise typical victims' rights provisions. This
compelling interest provision offers the flexibility to do just that."'
The desire not to bias an outcome against a domestic violence
87. S.J. Res. 3, § 3.
88. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (noting the test's
familiarity in various areas of constitutional law).
89. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 35.
90. Transcript of July 7, 1998 Proceedings, supra note 18, at 28 (statement of Sen.
Thompson).
91. See id. at 43 (statement of Sen. Kyl).
92. Majority Report, supra note 1, at 36.
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victim cast in the role of a defendant is understandable, but how that
instinct translates into a compelling need that can be articulated
categorically is entirely unclear and absolutely unexplained. Once
again, the Majority is attempting through a congressional report to
solve a political problem and to correct an inherent difficulty in the
use of a general constitutional provision to address a complex and
nuanced set of social problems.
C. The Majority Report's Inconsistent and Inadequate Analysis
Undermines its Potential Utility as an Interpretive Tool and
Thereby Destroys its Predictive Power
The Majority Report's inconsistency in analyzing the proposed
Amendment's plain language renders it a worthless tool for
forecasting or guiding subsequent judicial interpretation. Even if a
commentary of such length and complexity were clear and sensible, it
would be implausible to ascribe detailed knowledge of its content to
the state legislatures that would be called upon to adopt the
Amendment. But the Report is not clear and sensible. Instead, the
Report is incompatible with normal constructs of interpretation and is
crafted with predominantly political, rather than interpretive,
purposes. Courts are unlikely to view such a commentary as
probative of constitutional meaning.
V. TlE PROPOSED AMENDMENT, CERTAINLY IN THIS FORM AND
WITH THIS HISTORY, SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED
This Essay examines the fundamental ways in which the
proposed Amendment is flawed. Our focus is not on the numerous
areas of detail where reasonable people might differ about the
wisdom of providing crime victims with particular privileges. Instead,
we show that the Amendment, as understood by its proponents, is
fundamentally flawed even if one shares their stated goals.
The Essay makes three basic points. First, by the proponents'
own arguments, merely enacting paper guarantees of victims' rights
does little or nothing to help victims, and yet the proponents provide
no plausible argument that enacting this paper guarantee will lead to
any different result. The real problem is not one of rules on paper,
but of policies in practice, and the Amendment does nothing to affect
the latter. Second, the Amendment's broad language is on its face
excessively and fussily specific for a constitutional amendment.
Implicitly recognizing this fact, the Majority Report gives the
language a surprisingly loose and indeterminate interpretation,
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repeatedly trumpeting the flexibility that the Amendment will leave
legislatures, courts, and individual prosecutors to decide exactly what
to provide, and not to provide, to victims. This "interpretation"
deviates so far from the text on its surface that the courts likely would
not understand the text as described. Assuming the validity of the
Majority Report's reading, such an understanding of the Amendment
patently contradicts the supposed goal of establishing a uniform,
national standard. Third, Section 3, the enforcement provision,
explicitly vests in Congress the power to create exceptions to the
Amendment. The Majority Report reads Section 3 and the
Amendment as a whole to authorize Congress and state legislatures
to determine within very broad limits both the meaning of the
Amendment's substantive provisions and the universe of persons to
whom those provisions apply. Indeed, some proponents of the
Amendment candidly acknowledge that the Amendment is intended
to permit legislative "amendment" of its guarantees. The
Amendment thus would be a radical departure from the fundamental
principle that constitutional rules enacted by the people are immune
from change through ordinary legislation.
The proposed Amendment unfortunately displays a clear disdain
for the constitutional craft. It is not ready for serious consideration
by the Congress and ratification by the States. Its poorly crafted
terms insure that the articulated goal of its supporters for a uniform
set of rights will not be met. It gives no assurance that victims of
crime will receive real benefits. Moreover, the proposed Amendment
lacks clarity and is inconsistent with our constitutional tradition even
as to the "paper promises" it provides. The drafters have attempted
to wind their way between the interests of prosecutors, defendants,
and victims. Their effort, though ambitious, was inconsistent.
Perhaps through the detailed and changeable medium of legislation
and administrative regulations they could have achieved some
success. As a constitutional amendment, however, their effort has
clearly failed. This so-called Victims' Rights Amendment should not
be adopted.
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APPENDIX
SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 3
106th Congress
1st Session
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States to protect the rights of crime victims.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each
House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall
be valid for all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within
seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"Article -
"SECTION 1. A victim of a crime of violence, as these terms
may be defined by law, shall have the rights:
"to reasonable notice of, and not to be excluded from, any public
proceedings relating to the crime;
"to be heard, if present, and to submit a statement at all such
proceedings to determine a conditional release from custody, an
acceptance of a negotiated plea, or a sentence;
"to the foregoing rights at a parole proceeding that is not public,
to the extent those rights are afforded to the convicted offender;
"to reasonable notice of and an opportunity to submit a
statement concerning any proposed pardon or commutation of a
sentence;
"to reasonable notice of a release or escape from custody relating
to the crime;
"to consideration of the interest of the victim that any trial be
free from unreasonable delay;
"to an order of restitution from the convicted offender;
"to consideration for the safety of the victim in determining any
conditional release from custody relating to the crime; and
"to reasonable notice of the rights established by this article.
"SECTION 2. Only the victim or the victim's lawful
representative shall have standing to assert the rights established by
this article. Nothing in this article shall provide grounds to stay or
continue any trial, reopen any proceeding or invalidate any ruling,
except with respect to conditional release or restitution or to provide
rights guaranteed by this article in future proceedings, without staying
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or continuing a trial. Nothing in this article shall give rise to or
authorize the creation of a claim for damages against the United
States, a State, a political subdivision, or a public officer or employee.
"SECTION 3. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation. Exceptions to the rights established
by this article may be created only when necessary to achieve a
compelling interest.
"SECTION 4. This article shall take effect on the 180th day after
the ratification of this article. The right to an order of restitution
established by this article shall not apply to crimes committed before
the effective date of this article.
"SECTION 5. The rights and immunities established by this
article shall apply in Federal and State proceedings, including military
proceedings to the extent that the Congress may provide by law,
juvenile justice proceedings, and proceedings in the District of
Columbia and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the
United States."
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